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A R T I C L E
The Legal and Political Future of Physician-Assisted Suicide
Larry I. Palmer, LLB, University of Louisville, Louisville, Ky
IN 1997, THE US SUPREME COURT RULED THAT THERE IS NO
federal constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide (PAS)
but implied that individual states could nevertheless enact
statutes permitting its practice.1 The lower federal courts
promptly upheld the constitutionality of the Oregon Death
WithDignity Act,2 the only US state statute authorizing PAS.
Many observers of the court’s opinions thought that state
legislatures would determine the future of PAS.3 Instead, the
legal consequences for physicians and pharmacists in Or-
egon who assist in the deaths of terminally ill patients will
be determined by litigation concerning the scope of federal
drug laws now working its way through the federal appel-
late courts. The debate over PAS has thus been trans-
formed into a fundamental question: Which level of gov-
ernment should be the primary regulator of drugs in this
country—federal or state?
In November 2001, the US attorney general stated that
physicians legally prescribing lethal doses of drugs to ter-
minally ill patients under Oregon’s state law would none-
theless be violating federal drugs laws.5 He did not, how-
ever, threaten criminal prosecution of physicians who used
the Oregon statute to assist the death of terminally ill pa-
tients. Rather, he instructed Drug Enforcement Agency of-
ficials to revoke the permission of these physicians to pre-
scribemedications.4 This interpretation of the federal statute
took account specifically of the need of health care profes-
sionals to prescribe drugs to alleviate pain, especially of ter-
minally ill patients. The attorney general has stated that the
use of controlled substances to control pain, even if it could
lead to the death of a patient, was not prohibited under the
statute.4,5 In addition, he described how federal officials could
enforce the federal drug laws without examining the medi-
cal records of individual patients. Federal officials were in-
structed instead to gather their information about viola-
tions from the state registry of physician-assisted deaths that
was established under the requirements of theOregonDeath
With Dignity Act. Critics have argued that this interpreta-
tion will hamper efforts to provide aggressive palliative care
in Oregon.6 The state of Oregon and some Oregon physi-
cians promptly filed a lawsuit seeking to block the imple-
mentation of the attorney general’s ruling, thereby once again
shifting the debate back to the federal courts.7 (In the cur-
rent round of litigation, the state of Oregon has so far pre-
vailed in the district court.) The district court judge ruled
that state legislatures, not federal officials, can define the
meaning of dispensing controlled substances “in the course
of professional practice,” and determine when the use of a
controlled substance is used for “a medical purpose.” The
district court judge reasoned that the regulation of medical
practice in the United States has traditionally been the prov-
ince of the states rather than the federal government—and
should remain so. As such, he concluded that Oregon’s leg-
islative declaration that prescribing a lethal dosage of drugs
to terminally ill patients is legitimate professional practice8
should prevail over the federal government’s interest in a
particular drug enforcement policy.
The federal government is currently appealing the district
court’s ruling to the federal appeals court, arguing that the fed-
eral government can define “medical purpose” without ref-
erence to specific state statutes. The federal government’s ar-
gument is thatno single state legislature canunilaterally change
the definition of “medical purpose,” as this definition pro-
vides guidelines for federal officials and prosecutors.
It is unclear how the US Supreme Court will decide the
issue of access to barbiturates in Oregon for PAS. The court
has previously allowed the federal government to limit ac-
cess to marijuana for pain relief even when a state has de-
clared such use legal.9 If the federal government is ulti-
mately successful in its suit to use federal regulation to
discourage, if not halt, the practice of PAS in Oregon, this
will essentially end the political debate over legalizing PAS
at the state level.
Proponentsof legalizingPAScould then try topersuadeCon-
gress tomodify the federal Controlled SubstancesAct. It is not
clear that Congress would be willing to assist Oregon’s at-
tempt to be the only US state to allow PAS. In 1997, for in-
stance, Congress enacted a statute prohibiting the use of fed-
eral Medicare and Medicaid funds for PAS.10 No state has in
fact followed Oregon’s lead in enacting PAS statutes. At least
2 states, Maine and Michigan, have defeated ballot measures
thatwould have allowedPAS. If these votes represent the cur-
rent political sentiment on this issue, any new initiative to le-
galize assisted suicide seems unlikely to succeed.
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